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Strategy in an Uncertain Domain: Threat and Response in
Cyberspace
Abstract
Over the last decade, "cyber power" has become an increasingly prominent concept and
instrument of national strategy. This article explores the nature of contemporary cyber
power, focusing on how states should respond to "cyber uncertainty." Cases of cyber
operations against Estonia, Georgia, and Ukraine, as well as cyber operations conducted
(and suffered) by the United States, highlight the evolving role of cyber operations as an
instrument of statecraft. Given the complexity of cyber forensics and the polluted
information environment of the global public sphere, the public diplomacy of coordinated
attribution statements cannot be expected to cut through conclusively or uniformly. States
must therefore organise themselves effectively to produce and implement coherent cyber
strategy, improving their relational cyber power. This should focus on cyber security and
resilience, but also including effective cyber diplomacy, and assessment of what sovereign
offensive capabilities are desirable and feasible.
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Introduction
Edward Snowden’s 2013 revelations about the practices of the U.S.
National Security Agency and its allies in the 5 Eyes partnership
highlighted the prevalence of digital espionage and the challenges faced by
states in improving communications security and protecting digital data.1
The contemporaneous rise in offensive cyber operations as a tool of state
and non-state actors has required greater priority to cyber defence and
offense in national strategies. Cyber operations against adversary
infrastructure are now an increasingly common part of a state’s toolkit,
whether the reportedly US-Israeli Stuxnet operation against Iranian
nuclear infrastructure, or the reportedly Russian cyber operations against
targets in Estonia, Georgia, and Ukraine.2
A state’s cyber power is therefore an increasingly important component of
wider national power.3 It is a relevant dimension in national efforts to
enhance socio-economic development and prosperity, information
security, national resilience, domestic security and national defence. It is,
therefore, a cross-cutting priority in national security strategy.
This article focuses on one aspect of the strategic impact of cyber
operations, namely the problem of uncertainty and the challenge of
establishing widespread acceptance of attribution. The problem of cyber
uncertainty is manifested in a congested grey zone of competition and
conflict between state and non-state actors. With asymmetries of
knowledge and understanding between state actors and within the global
public sphere, uncertainty is a pervasive feature of the cyber domain. The
article draws on case study analysis to highlight the challenges that states
must address in cyberspace. The article concludes with an assessment of
contemporary cyber power and a tentative forecast of future directions for
national strategy.

The Congested Grey Zone and Cyber Uncertainty
According to a former senior United Kingdom cyber official: “There have
been more than 200 acts popularly portrayed as state-on-state cyberattacks. Most have been a combination of espionage, media influence,
economic coercion, and political intervention, deliberately calibrated
below the legal threshold for an act of aggression that would justify an
34
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armed response, and therefore in the grey zone between peace and war.”4
The acceleration and intensification of this threat is global, but it is
experienced differently depending on the strategic situation of a given
state. The most capable state actors have developed offensive cyber
capabilities and integrated these into existing defence and intelligence
communities, such as U.S. Cyber Command or the United Kingdom’s
recently avowed National Cyber Force.5
Competition and conflict between states manifests a particular character
in the cyber domain. However, the nature of inter-state competition and
conflict is enduring, channelling the Clausewitzian distinction between the
character and nature of war. It is shaped by rival claims and objectives, the
fundamentally agonistic feature of which arguably defines the concept of
the political.6 As such, it is unsurprising that the first reported decades of
cyber operations can be seen to have followed settled lines of interstate
competition and conflict, as well as conforming to the on-going ‘global war
on terrorism’ in the case of coalition cyber operations against Daesh.
The article uses case study analysis to illustrate the problem of cyber
uncertainty, focusing on the cyber operations against Estonia in 2007,
Georgia in 2008, and Ukraine in 2016. These operations were consistent
with the policies pursued overtly by the Russian Federation during ongoing bilateral tensions and/or specific periods of armed conflict with the
victim states. Even so, the Russian state denied responsibility, shifted
blame and tried to spread doubt about the identity of the culprits—
signature traits of the “heavily contested information environment”
surrounding cyber attribution.7 Such operations inhabit a congested grey
zone of competition and conflict between states and non-state actors.8
Whether the resultant deniability is widely perceived as plausible or
implausible, covert action has long been employed by states to interfere in
the affairs of other states; cyber capabilities are merely the latest chapter
in this history, amplifying a state’s options for covert action.9 The deeply
technical nature of the domain and the complexity of the forensic analysis
necessary to determine attribution, creates asymmetries of knowledge and
understanding, exacerbating existing fissures between states and across
the global public sphere. This additional layer of cyber uncertainty
complicates the decisions facing victim states and their allies in how to
respond to cyber operations.10
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Uncertainty is exacerbated by states’ use of proxies and cut-outs.11 It is
amplified further by possibility of false flag operations and deliberate
misdirection. It has been reported that the U.S. Central Intelligence
Agency had developed anti-forensics tools, for example by applying nonEnglish language settings (including Russian and Korean) to its malware.12
Similarly, a Russian intelligence agency reportedly conducted a cyber
operation against the 2018 Winter Olympics, unsuccessfully trying to
implicate North Korea as the perpetrator.13 Without the forensic tools
possessed by major cyber and intelligence powers such as the United
States, or by the most capable threat intelligence companies—and
potentially even with such expertise—the attribution of cyber operations
can be a difficult, time-consuming process. And given the arcane, exclusive
nature of attribution, and the polluted, contested nature of the global
information environment, legitimating attribution judgements in the
global public sphere is a significant challenge for public diplomacy.
Social, economic, and political life increasingly depends on and is shaped
by digital technologies. This is also the case for inter-state competition and
conflict: Contesting narratives through digital diplomacy and subversive
disinformation operations; the increasingly online activities of intelligence
agencies, armed services and aligned non-state actors, achieving effects in
and through cyberspace. Contemporary multi-domain operations entail a
cyber dimension.14 And strategically, actors employ cyber operations for
compellence and dissuasion, although efficacy is contested.15 Given the
complexity of physical and virtual layers that constitute cyberspace,
identifying a cyber operation and attributing it to a specific culprit is an
effort requiring different levels of analysis and is likely to rely on cyber
forensic equities in both the state and private sectors. Where investigating
states possess significant intelligence capabilities, it is possible that human
and signals intelligence reporting might contribute to the totality of
evidence supporting attribution analysis, providing insights into the
technical operational practices of the alleged culprit (state or non-state)
actor or into elite decisions authorizing such cyber operations.16
Where such sophisticated, composite capabilities for attribution analyses
are absent, or else insufficient, attribution is often guided by lowerconfidence, cui bono logic and/or by the receipt of attribution analyses
shared by more cyber-capable states. In the latter case, there is a question
of trust potentially exacerbated by information asymmetry: Is attribution
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assessment shared simply as a global public good, or to further the foreign
policy objectives of the sharing state(s)? Following cui bono logic in the
absence of other information, having explored the relevant geopolitical
context, the actor most likely to benefit from the operation might plausibly
be regarded as a potential perpetrator.17 Indeed, unless the cyber
operation is purely retributive and destructive, the instrumentality of the
operation as a compellent or deterrent action arguably relies on the victim
correctly inferring the culprit’s true identity and intent.18 Consequently, it
has been observed that cyber operations more often focus on degrading
adversary capabilities than on achieving compellence or dissuasion.19
Cyber operations against state and non-state targets instrumentalize
uncertainty in the pursuit of national (and sometimes simply acquisitive
and criminal) objectives. Deniability, however implausible, is particularly
important from the perspective of international law and the prospect of
being held accountable.20 The absence of dispositive evidence of a culprit’s
identity complicates a victim state’s decision process, calling into doubt
the basis for retaliatory or other responses.

Cyber Operations and Russian National Strategy
Russian state efforts over the last decade to re-assert influence and
relevance in global affairs have been described as a case of "asymmetric
balancing."21 The strategy aims to counterbalance adversaries through a
range of actions to achieve effects without reaching the threshold of armed
conflict with a major adversary. Notable cyber operations in this period
that appear to be consistent with such a strategy are those against Estonia
in 2007, Georgia in 2008, and Ukraine in 2014, and 2016. The three cases
are different, but indicate an evolving method of integrating cyber and
conventional capabilities in combined operations.
Between April and May 2007, Estonia was the target of a series of cyberattacks against its government websites, banking system, internet service
providers, telecommunications, and news agencies. There were three
waves of attacks in total, ranging from Distributed Denial of Service
(DDoS) to digital vandalism. The attacks had a significant effect on
Estonia, a country that was already highly interconnected, with
considerable digital access to public services. Estonia's digital exposure led
its Foreign Minister to claim that the attacks were real, virtual and
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psychological.22 The cyber operations against Estonia occurred in the
context of growing tensions between Russia and Estonia over the relocation of a statue honoring Soviet soldiers.23 Tensions escalated into
public protests in Tallinn, amplified by Russia’s sharp public criticism of
the statue’s relocation.24 It was in this suggestive context of sharply
deteriorating bilateral relations that the wave of cyber operations was
conducted against Estonia.
The cyber operations also occurred in the context of a broader set of
coercive or retaliatory actions: An unofficial blockade disrupting crossborder trade with Estonia; domestic political calls for diplomatic and
economic sanctions; and attacks against the Estonian embassy in Moscow
reportedly by national youth groups, unhindered by local law enforcement.
The digital disruptions were conducted against strategic targets, such as
financial services, communications hubs, and government websites. The
then Estonian defence minister described the totality of the measures as a
form of psychological terror.25
Attempts to trace the attack suggested that they originated in multiple
countries, including Egypt, Peru, and Vietnam.26 Furthermore,
instructions on how to carry out the attacks had been published on the
internet, multiplying the hypothetical points of origin of the attacks.
Despite these elements of uncertainty, the political context and the
operation’s scale and level of coordination was suggestive of some degree
of Russian state involvement or toleration.27 Needless to say, Russia has
repeatedly rejected this allegation. The re-location of a monument in
Tallinn did not pose a significant national security threat to Russia,
representing perhaps more of a snub to national pride, particularly when
carried out by a smaller neighbor. This suggests cyber operations could
have been chosen as a low-cost response, perceived as entailing low risk.28
The implausible deniability implicit in the cyber operations against
Estonia highlighted the potential for states to conduct—or contract proxies
to perpetrate—disruptive or destructive operations against adversaries in
cyberspace whilst retaining both a consequential degree of uncertainty and
a sense of restraint, for example, calibrating offensive operations to test,
but not to flagrantly violate, the threshold for triggering the collective
defence provision (Article 5) of the North Atlantic Treaty. This ensured
that Russia was not subject to significant retaliatory measures following
this episode.
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The Estonia case should have served as a clear warning to states that
improvements were necessary in cyber security practices in the public and
private sectors to reduce the risk of being subject to damaging digital
disruptions.29 Unsurprisingly, Estonia acted on this warning. It introduced
a range of measures improving national cyber defence and resilience.
Estonia created a Cyber Defence League, a defence agency within the
military hierarchy, comprising expert volunteers defending Estonia's
digital infrastructure. Diplomatically, the North Atlantic Treaty Alliance
(NATO) Cooperative Cyber Defence Center of Excellence—in preparation
prior to the 2007 attacks—was created in 2008 and located in Tallinn. The
Center represents a cyber knowledge-generation and -exchange initiative,
improving NATO member states’ cyber defence capabilities.
Estonia was not the only state in this period to be subjected to digital
disruptions during diplomatic contestation with Russia. In 2008, as the
result of tensions arising from the separatist movement in South Ossetia
and the country's growing proximity to NATO, the situation in Georgia
deteriorated, culminating in a short period of armed conflict with Russia.
Russian military operations were accompanied by cyber operations.30 This
represented a relatively new situation, regarded by one scholar as “the first
case in history of a coordinated cyberspace domain attack synchronized
with major combat actions in other warfighting domains.”31
As with Estonia, cyber operations against Georgia included DDoS attacks
and digital vandalism against government websites, communication
agencies, internet providers and the Georgian media. Georgia’s financial
and transport infrastructure were targeted. Instructions for conducting
DDoS attacks against Georgian servers had also been disseminated
publicly, again illustrating an effort to empower proxies and/or shift
blame. Georgia’s case differs from Estonia, however, due to the increased
sophistication and coordination of the operations. One of the first sites to
be taken down was a forum of Georgian hackers, to prevent attempts to reestablish interrupted services or to retaliate in cyberspace.32 Following the
disruption of Georgia’s communications infrastructure, Russian invaded
with conventional armed forces. Analysis of the Georgia case has led some
to argue that the extent of operational coordination implies the systematic
integration of cyber domain operations with those of traditional forces at
the strategic, operational, and tactical levels.33 Whatever the efforts to
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obscure ultimate responsibility for the cyber operations, the director of
Georgia’s National Security Council argued that, in the context of armed
conflict, Russian denials of responsibility were implausible.34
The Georgia case highlights the combination of implausibly denied cyber
operations with avowed conventional military operations. On the ladder of
uncertainty, the next logical step would be to align implausibly deniable
cyber operations with implausibly deniable military operations, for
example by creating uncertainty about command and control over units
fighting in an adversary’s territory. Just six years later, this would become
a salient feature of Russian operations against Ukraine from 2014 to
present.
Prior to the 2014 invasion of Ukraine by Russia, bilateral diplomatic
tensions had intensified in 2013 over Ukraine’s negotiations with the
European Union and Russian fears that Ukraine was moving outside of its
sphere of influence.35 This prompted the operation to annex Crimea, with
a hastily convened referendum to declare that a majority of the population
voted to be incorporated into the Russian Federation.36 Annexation of
Crimea and continued destabilization of eastern Ukraine prompted a
diplomatic response from the European Union and United States, in the
form of coercive economic measures, without altering de facto Russian
control of Crimea or on-going instability in eastern Ukraine.37
The cyber dimension of the attack on Ukraine involved efforts to
destabilize the Ukraine government and create a climate of confusion and
uncertainty between government and society, using digital disinformation
operations including the production and dissemination of "fake news”.38
In addition, the persistence of cyber operations undermined the
effectiveness of communication between Ukraine’s government and armed
forces.39 The range of operations spanned information operations, with
DDoS attacks against strategic websites; leaking government and private
data; and messages sent to Ukraine military personnel to encourage
desertion. Cyber operations were also conducted against Ukraine’s energy
infrastructure, resulting in a power blackout in Kiev.40 Several Western
states subsequently publicly attributed the blackout to Russian action.41
Even so, global perceptions of Russia's culpability for cyber operations
against Ukraine since 2014 have arguably come more from the political
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context than from widespread knowledge, understanding or acceptance of
dispositive evidence of attribution.42
The Ukraine case introduces a significant element of the strategic debate
about offensive cyber operations: The targeting of civilian infrastructure.
As states develop offensive cyber capabilities, they are faced with
consequential ethical and strategic decisions about how and when these
capabilities should be used.43 Offensive cyber operations can be used
tactically or operationally, integrated in multi-domain operations, but the
strategic targeting of critical infrastructure increases the risk that cyber
operations lead to escalation out of the grey zone and into armed conflict.
This is a particular risk given the confusion in public debate between
incidents of cyber espionage and offensive cyber operations—both being
labelled as cyber attacks requiring cost-imposition—that was discernible in
the wake of the SolarWinds breach.44 In the current environment, in which
nation states possess a monopoly on the most sophisticated offensive
cyber operational capabilities, the greater the degree of sophistication and
alignment with operations in other domains that a given cyber operation
required, the stronger will be the implicit assumption that such operations
involved some form of state activity or direction, even if dispositive
evidence of ultimate responsibility is unavailable.45
It is clear from these brief case studies that states are increasingly at risk
from sophisticated cyber operations whether conducted in isolation or as
part of a coordinated, multi-domain military operation. Both the range of
techniques and the degree of integration with other domains appears to
have improved during the 2000s. Recent tensions between Iran and the
United States, and between Iran and Israel, have seen the reported use of
cyber operations as part of carefully calibrated responses designed to
control the potential for escalating conflict.46
As this section has aimed to demonstrate, a global and public debate is
necessary to consider the strategic, institutional, and operational lessons
that states should learn from contemporary developments in cyber
operations and their role in international relations. Such a debate has
developed over the last decade, but is uneven and largely dominated by
U.S. voices and issues. This is unsurprising, given the weight of U.S. cyber
power, but it risks the distortive impact of assuming that the threats and
opportunities of offensive cyber operations affect all states equally. There
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is a need for a wider global conversation, one that is sensitive to the
contingencies and modalities of cyber security in different national and
regional contexts.47

Conclusion
The cases of Estonia, Georgia, and Ukraine highlight the role of offensive
cyber operations in contemporary competition and conflict between states.
Given the global nature of the domain, few if any states can prudently
ignore the need to cultivate cyber security and resilience. Nor can states
simply focus on cyber threats emanating from neighbors or the immediate
region. State actors and cybercriminals have global reach. The precise
institutional configuration of cyber responsibilities in a state will depend
on contingent factors, such as the historical development of sovereign
cyber capabilities (whether in the military or civilian intelligence
agencies), and the extent to which armed forces have adopted domestic
security missions as part of national defence. Whatever the impact of
contingency and national specificity, however, some uniform observations
are possible.
National strategic decision makers must recognize that military actions in
traditional domains now occur increasingly in conjunction with different
levels of cyber operations. What happened in Georgia in 2008 and to a
greater extent in Ukraine from 2014-onward demonstrates the evolution
of cyber operations, as a tool of statecraft and as a military instrument,
complementing operations in other domains. The task of contemporary
national defence must involve the security and resilience of digital
infrastructure. This requires a coherently managed, strategic approach to
cooperation between defence, law enforcement and the management of
critical infrastructure. The resilience of the digital homeland is now an
integral component of national defence. In early 2022, at the beginning of
the most recent phase of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, cyber operations
appear to have played a less prominent role in wider Russian strategy than
might have been anticipated. It is too soon to assess at time of writing
(early March) what factors most accounted for this: improved Ukrainian
cyber defences; assistance by foreign state and corporate actors;
intentional Russian planning that placed lower emphasis on the
supporting role of cyber operations; or another contingency that
undermined the alignment between cyber and wider operations. Far from
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undermining the argument that digital resilience is an integral element in
national strategy, this latest cyber element of the conflict arguably
reinforces the case for states to pursue broad efforts to improve national
cyber defences.48
The grey zone of uncertainty—however implausible the deniability—
exploited by cyber operations requires a national response that transcends
improvements in the security of digital targets. States must consider how
to reduce uncertainty by increasing national capabilities in cyber forensics.
This should not be construed narrowly to refer simply to the creation of a
national cyber defence or security center, but broadly to encompass
different elements of national power and the role they play in enhancing
national cyber forensic capabilities. This list should include: Efforts to
build private sector capabilities in cyber security; structured and targeted
state intervention in national education to ensure a future pipeline of
suitably qualified cyber professionals; and reviewing the contribution of
the collection and analysis capabilities of national intelligence agencies to
the process of cyber investigation and attribution analysis.
Third, in the same way that national cyber strategy is not solely
governmental and involves the crucial contribution of the private sector
and wider society in upholding high standards of cyber security, so too
does it transcend the domestic to include international and multilateral
dimensions.49 A state’s international relations are a major determining
factor in identifying its likely cyber adversaries. Recent efforts by
Ukraine’s and Georgia’s allies to publicly attribute cyber operations to
Russia are examples of diplomatic solidarity through coordinated public
attribution, although the strategy of public attribution is difficult to
implement successfully.50
Recognition of the need for multi-domain operations is clearly part of a
state’s response to the rising salience of cyber operations, as is heightened
awareness of and response to the cyber risk to defence platforms,
command and control and communications infrastructure. Another
dimension of the cyber defence conundrum is the issue of the national
requirement for an offensive cyber capability. Again, this question is
inseparable from questions about the extent to which states can rely on
private sector and foreign governmental partners to help to grow its
sovereign cyber industrial base. Just as deficiency in national cyber
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investigation and attribution analysis leaves states reliant on the public
good of analyses shared by other states or the services provided by leading
cyber security companies, perceived deficiency in a state’s ability to
respond symmetrically to a cyber operation might reduce the credibility of
its overall deterrence strategy, or force it to rely disproportionately on
other means. Offensive cyber capabilities should, therefore, increasingly
feature in states’ national cyber defence strategies.
The above is by no means exhaustive and is necessarily brief as a summary
of possible institutional and strategic reforms open to many states in their
approach to the problems of cyber uncertainty. Given cyberspace’s
ubiquity, states need a cyber strategy that encompasses coherently the
overlapping issues of cyber defence, cyber security, resilience, and
offensive cyber. Most importantly, such a strategic approach should
recognize the shaping effects exerted on national cyber strategy by a state’s
wider national security strategy and foreign policy posture. Cyber
operations are only one dimension of a challenge that transcends any one
military domain, institutional division within government, boundaries
between public and private sectors, and indeed between national
governments.
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